Abstract
Introduction
The global market for offshore business process (BP) and information technology (IT) outsourcing is rising exponentially. One estimate suggests that the annual global market for offshore BP and IT outsourcing will cross $100 billion by 2008 (Babcock 2004) 1 .
Gartner Inc. billion by 2010 (Chakrabarty et al. 2006) .
Micro and macro level impacts of offshore BP and IT outsourcing are, however, far from clear (Kotabe and Murray 2004) . Thus there are some well-founded rationales for and against offshore outsourcing as well as a number of misinformed and ill guided viewpoints.
At the micro level, notwithstanding a substantial potential savings, a number of firms are reluctant to outsource offshore. Some firms engaged in offshore outsourcing, on the other hand, have been unable to reap the benefits. A Gartner analyst predicted that during [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] , 60 percent of organizations outsourcing customer services will face customer defections and incur hidden costs that will cancel or even exceed savings . Another study indicated that half the firms that shift processes offshore fail to generate expected financial benefits (Aron and Singh 2005) .
Next, consider macro-level effects. Some studies have indicated that if properly implemented, offshore outsourcing creates more jobs than those sent overseas.
Nonetheless, fears related to offshore outsourcing have generated confrontational reactions and raised a public outcry in outsourcing origin countries. Domestic lobbies such as labor unions, members of affected industries and professionals losing jobs are pushing for protectionism (Pfannenstein and Tsai 2004) . Job losses associated with offshore outsourcing became a major issue during recent EU constitution referendums and in the 2004 U.S. presidential campaign (Kaka and Sinha 2005) .
Because of a lack of a systematic framework, there has been substantial debate about the long-term consequences of offshore outsourcing (Lacity and Willcocks 1998) .
The existing literature provides very little guidance about the factors that are important in selecting outsourcing service suppliers (Kotabe 2001) . Offshore outsourcing decisions related to the optimum quantity, activities and destinations are accomplished only through the use of common sense, accumulated experience and rough judgment (Kshetri and Williamson 2004) .
Advancement of the art and science of offshore outsourcing will facilitate to speed up the learning curve (Rottman and Lacity 2004) for firms engaged in outsourcing relations. It will also help policy makers in outsourcing destinations devise strategy to attract outsourcing jobs. Such an understanding will also assist policy makers in an outsourcing origin country (e.g., U.S.) assess broader impacts of outsourcing. To fill these research gaps, this paper draws upon institutional theory to develop an understanding of factors affecting the pattern of the global flow of offshore IT and BP outsourcing.
Before proceeding, we offer some clarifying definitions. IT outsourcing is defined as subcontracting a company's IT functions to an external vendors (Cheon et al. 1995 , Lacity and Willcocks 1995 , Loh and Venkatraman 1992 , Sengupta and Zviran 1997 . Similarly, BPO is defined as long-term contracting of a firm's (hereafter: the client firm) non-core business processes to an external service provider (hereafter: the outsourcing firm) (Romberg 1998 offshore deals range from 20-50 percent but can take up to five years to materialize (Vowler 2003) .
Impacts on outsourcing origin countries: According to the Information Technology
Association of America, more than half of new jobs created in IT field will go offshore (Challenger 2005 
Institutions and Offshore Outsourcing
At the broadest level, the concept of "social co-evolving ecosystem" ( An economic system is arguably a "coordinated set of formal and informal institutions" (Dallago 2002 ) influencing economic agents' behavior (Matutinović 2005) .
Institutions, on the other hand, can be considered as a conceptual subset of the social ecosystem. Put differently, all economic phenomena arguably have institutional components and implications (Parto 2005) . Institutional perspective can help us understand complex causes and roots associated with offshore outsourcing (Ang and Cummings 1997 , Hu et al. 1997 , Lacity and Hirschheim 1993 , Levina and Ross 2003 , Loh and Venkatraman 1992 .
In an outsourcing agreement, regulatory controls such as legal documents, policies, formal systems, standards and procedures may establish the relationship between the two parties and specify boundaries (Das and Teng 2001 ). Yet they represent only "incomplete contracting" (Grossman and Helpman 2005) and hence cannot be exhaustive. Interpersonal and informal infrastructures are required to resolve ambiguities and make the outcome more predictable (Kanter 1994, Parker and Russell 2004) . Social or informal control is based on norms, shared values, internalization and beliefs (Eisenhardt 1985) .
Offshore outsourcing entails developing long-term relationship with partners that have different norms and are embedded in different social and legal institutions. Approaching offshore outsourcing from the standpoint of institutions, we can capture complex factors discussed above. North (1990) defines institutions as "macrolevel rules of the game" (p. 27). Institutions can be better understood in the context of the tasks for which they were created (Holm 1995) . For outsourcing projects, institutions guide behaviors of concerned parties by mediating the relationships among various stakeholders and technologies enabling offshore outsourcing (Russo 2001) 4 .
Up to this point, we have concentrated on how institutions affect offshore outsourcing. Following the analogy of social ecosystem discussed above, we can argue that outsourcing activities also influence institutions. Notwithstanding their connotation of persistence (Parto 2005) , durability (Hodgson 2003) and stability (Scott 2001, p.48), institutions are subject to change in evolutionary time (Parto 2005) . Zucker (1988, p. 26) draws an analogy from physics to describe institutional changes mechanisms. He argues that institutions continuously undergo change due to entropy, a tendency toward disorder or disorganization (p. 26). An implication of the entropy-like characteristics is that people and organizations can modify and reproduce institutions (Scott 2001) . Institutional changes take place incrementally (North 1990 ) as well as in discontinuous fashions (Scott 2001, 48) . Offshore outsourcing is thus likely to change institutional structure of outsourcing origin and destination countries. Such changes, in turn, are likely to affect offshore BP and IT outsourcing.
In this article, we use Scott's (1995 Scott's ( , 2001 5 approach as the framework for analyzing BP and IT outsourcing. Scott has conceptualized institutions as composed of three pillars: regulatory, normative and cognitive. Scott's pillar model is an umbrella concept for integrating various institutional theories and approaches from a wide variety of research disciplines such as economics, sociology and anthropology.
Regulative institutions
Regulative institutions consist of "explicit regulative processes: rule setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities" (Scott 1995, 35) . They are related to regulatory bodies and the existing laws and rules that influence offshore outsourcing. These institutions focus on pragmatic legitimacy concerns in managing the demands of regulators and governments (Kelman 1987) . Individuals and organizations adhere to them so that they would not suffer the penalty for noncompliance (Hoffman 1999). For regulatory institutions, the basis of compliance is expedience and noncompliance can result in regulatory sanctions.
Normative institutions
While regulative rules are parts of regulative institutions, social rules are components of normative institutions. Normative components introduce "a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social life" (Scott 1995, 37) . Practices that are consistent with and take into account different assumptions and value systems of national cultures are likely to be successful (Schneider 1999) . Elements of normative institutions include trade associations or professional associations (e.g., The Organization for the Rights of American Workers, and NASSCOM, a lobby for the software and services industry) that can use social obligation as a tool to induce certain behavior within the outsourcing industry. Labor institutions such as educational establishments, labor certification, training agencies and, professional norms, trade unions and labor-relations are also components of normative institutions in the destination country. Normative institutions are concerned with procedural legitimacy and outsourcers and clients to embrace socially accepted norms and behaviors (Selznick 1984) . The basis of compliance in this case derives from social obligations and non-adherence can lead to societal and professional sanctions (Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002) . The standards set by these institutions are separate from the laws and regulations set forth by local and federal agencies.
Cognitive institutions
Although all components of institutions are intertwined with culture (Neale 1994, 404), cognitive institutions are arguably most closely associated with culture (Jepperson 1991 ).
These components represent culturally supported habits that influence the pattern of offshore outsourcing flows. In most cases, they are associated with cognitive legitimacy concerns that are based on subconsciously accepted rules and customs as well as some taken-for-granted cultural account related to offshore outsourcing (Berger and Luckmann 1967) . Cognitive programs affect the way people notice, categorize, and interpret stimuli from the environment. Scott (1995, 40) suggests that "cognitive elements constitute the nature of reality and the frames through which meaning is made". Although carried by individual members, cognitive programs are elements of the social environment and are thus social in nature (Berger and Luckman 1967) . Various stakeholders related to outsourcing (e.g., labor unions, members of affected industries and professionals in outsourcing origin countries, and potential workers in outsourcing destination countries), however, have varied cognitive programs that influence the lens through which they view the outsourcing project. Compliance in the case of cognitive legitimacy concerns is due to habits; outsourcing firms and implementers may not even be aware that they are complying.
At this point, it must be emphasized that each institutional pillar both reflects as well as determines the nature of other pillars. For instance, political scientist Robert Axelrod (1997) comments on the relationship between regulative and normative institutions:
Social norms and laws are often mutually supporting. This is true because social norms can become formalized into laws and because laws provide external validation of norms 6 .
Institution-offshore BP and IT Outsourcing Nexus: Some Hypotheses
In this section, we develop some propositions on institutional factors affecting the flow of offshore BP and IT outsourcing (Table 1) . We employ three main sources for the reasoning to develop propositions: theoretical explanations for "whys" and "hows" of offshore BP and IT outsourcing, past empirical findings and practice/experience (Webster and Watson 2002, Whetten 1989, p. 491 Although some of the factors (e.g., rule of law in an outsourcing destination country) are also applicable to other forms of international trade or investment, offshore outsourcing has distinct mechanisms. Its uniqueness stems from a number of sources.
First, offshore outsourcing is relatively new. The newness is associated with a lack of rules and laws as well as codes of conduct, especially in outsourcing destination countries.
Second, unlike traditional forms of international trade and investment, offshore outsourcing is interpreted as a force that replaces some of the operations in home country (e.g., the U.S.). This leads to negative public views of offshore outsourcing. Third, compared to other forms of international trade and investment, offshore outsourcing, especially BPO, entails a higher degree of interaction among people of different cultures.
In most BPOs, employees of an outsourcing firm interact with the client firm as well as with the latter's customers. Institutional compatibility is thus of paramount importance for the success of outsourcing relations.
Insert table 1 here

Regulative institutions and offshore BP and IT outsourcing
Privacy laws in the origin country
A large proportion of offshore outsourcing entails significant information flows. An estimate of the Gartner group indicated that offshore BPO services, which typically require the transfer of personal data, grew by 38 percent in 2003 to reach $2 billion (Swartz 2004a) . Privacy, thus, has been a major concern in offshore outsourcing decisions because of difficulties related to enforcing privacy laws in foreign countries'
courts (Lucas 2004 ).
Some analysts argue that privacy rules have become a form of disguised protectionism in offshore outsourcing (Davis 2004) . Some business sectors (e.g., healthrelated services) are more protected than others (The Economist 2001). For instance, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) requires firms providing services to healthcare organizations (e.g., outsourcing vendors) to maintain confidentiality of the information they receive (Hazelwood et al. 2005) 7 . In 2004, two bills were introduced in the U.S. Congress that would limit offshore outsourcing of radiology (Piotrowski 2004) 8 .
Countries across the world also vary in terms of the strictness of privacy laws.
The U.S., for instance, has stricter privacy laws than economies in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Shaw 1993) . As of the mid-2004, there were 186 bills pending in the U.S.
Congress and 40 state legislatures that aimed to limit offshore outsourcing (Engardio et al. 2004 , Solomon 2004 There is no assurance that privacy will be protected when personal data is transferred to offshore companies that are beyond the reach of US law enforcement, and the federal government needs to wake up to the risks that this presents... The implications for identity theft by gangs, breaches of homeland security by al-Quida, and criminal misuse and abuse by multinational corporations are frightening ).
The European Union (EU) has even stricter privacy laws than in the U.S. Whereas the U.S. has a more relaxed approach to privacy and in an attempt to encourage marketing innovations, prefers to rely on voluntary self-regulation, the EU tends to enforce privacy rights through legislation (The Economist 1999). The EU Privacy Directive 1998, for instance, aims to protect the privacy of citizens when their personal data is being processed. The data covered by the directive may include sensitive employee or customer-related data (Balaji 2004) . To summarize, because of these regulations, less data based information will be allowed into the hands of other companies which means less outsourcing will take place. The discussion in this section is summarized as:
Proposition 1: Ceteris paribus 10 , the strictness of privacy laws in an originating country is negatively related to BP and IT outsourcing outflow from the country.
Rule of law in the destination country
Theoretically security, privacy, or identity breaches could happen within as well as outside the U.S. Nonetheless, the prospect of civil and criminal prosecution is weaker when the breach takes place in a country with a weak rule of law (Lowes 2004 ).
Perceived or real security, privacy, or identity breaches can diminish the value created by offshore outsourcing (PR Newswire Europe 2005).
Some of the fears are well-founded. As discussed in the last section, there have been a number of well-publicized security breaches and concerns about service quality (Kaka and Sinha 2005) . If a U.S. customer becomes a victim of such breaches, the U.S.
company that outsourced work is legally responsible (Engardio et al. 2004 ). Theoretically, the U.S. company can shift the liability to its offshore outsourcing partner 11 . Contracts are, however, difficult to enforce in countries that have a weak legislative environment.
A country with a strong rule of law has "sound political institutions, a strong court system" and citizens that are "willing to accept the established institutions and to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes" (International Country Risk Guide 1996).
On the contrary, in a number of countries, it is very tough to operate due to weak rule of Banks will continue to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing to India, and in fact, continue to send more processes overseas. But they'll ask harder questions. They will make their contracts more airtight, and the regulators are going to be there (Fest 2005 Many U.K. banks insist on compliance with this directive (Fest 2005) .
Countries with weak rule of law also lack standard identifier like the U.S. Social security number making it difficult to check potential employees' background. In some countries, it costs up to $1,000 per employee for a detailed background check (Schwartz 2005) .
Developing countries are strengthening the rule of law to attract offshore outsourcing. For instance, Pakistan's Foreign Data security and Protection Act of 2004 aims at providing protection and safety of foreign data processed within the country (Hazelwood et al. 2005) 14 . We propose that:
Proposition 2: A lack of strong rule of law is negatively related to outsourcing inflow in a destination country.
Normative institutions and offshore BP and IT outsourcing
The union and public pressures against offshore outsourcing in the origin country A study conducted by the University of Maryland indicated that proportion of individuals with incomes over $100,000 in the U.S. that actively support free trade slid from 57 percent in 1999 to 28 percent in January 2004 (Amiti and Wei 2004) . In most industrialized countries, public views on outsourcing are more negative than on international trade and investment (Kuttner 1997 15 .
Social norms affect the extent to which offshore outsourcing may substitute domestic labor (Rodrik 1997 ). Social obligation is being used as a lever for pressuring companies that send jobs overseas. Offshore outsourcing has been a controversial issue in 16 . This finding reflects bitter feelings over layoffs associated with offshore outsourcing (Appleton 1996) . Ironically, the truth and falsify of such fear is less relevant than the fear itself, which could lead to vigorous opposition to outsourcing.
Unions have put together moral and ethical arguments against offshore outsourcing. They argue that firms in the U.S. have social obligation that goes beyond profit maximization (Figart 2001 ). Offshore outsourcing is also being attacked on the ground that it is unethical for executives to award themselves large bonuses and outsourcing jobs to overseas contractors that don't pay health benefits to their employees 
Professional organizations in the destination country
Difficulties related to integrity and accountability and distance of the workforce co-vary positively (Printing World 2005) . Offshore outsourcing provides firms in foreign countries with an opportunity for engaging in unethical and/or deceptive practices. Client firms often become skeptical about the honesty and ethicality of outsourcing firms. The existence of professional ethics and codes of conduct can mitigate such skepticism. Savan (1989) defines "the professions" as groups that apply "special knowledge in the service of a client" (p. 179). A profession is also self-regulated by a code of ethics (Claypool et al. 1990, Cohen and Pant 1991) and is characterized by its role as a moral community (Camenisch 1983) . The codes of conduct generally require members to maintain higher standards of conduct than may be required by law (Backoff and Martin 1991) . The codes also help make professional norms visible (Frankel 1989 ) and act as a vehicle to assure the public and clients that members are competent, have integrity, and maintain and enforce high standards (Ward et al. 1993) . Apart from convincing external parties of the integrity of the profession, codes play an important role in forcing members of a profession to question their values (Meyer 1987) . Codes also act as a support system against improper demands and serve as a basis for resolving disputes (Frankel 1989 ).
In some developing countries, active trade or professional associations that enforce ethics and codes of conduct have helped overcome adverse impacts of the weak legislative environment. For instance, medical transcription companies in Karnataka state of India have formed the Indian Medical Transcription Industry Association (IMTIA).
IMTIA aims to shape industry related policies and standards including data protection, security and privacy of confidential information, and share best practices in medical transcription, human resources and training initiatives (Businessline 2004) . The Business Processing Association of the Philippines (BPAP) is similarly an organization representing IT and services industry and serves as the one-stop information and advocacy gateway for the country's IT-enabled services 19 . Likewise, NASSCOM intends to have security practices of its 860 members audited by international accounting firms (Engardio et al. 2004 ).
NASSCOM is also introducing an "assessment and certification" programs for would-be employees, which are expected to cut costs, ease wage pressures and discourage illegal and unethical behaviors (The Economist 2005b). Industry leaders have also been advocating the adoption of certification under the information security management systems (ISMS) evolved by the British Standards Institution to provide guidance on organizational aspects of risk assessment and control ). The certification covers security related issues such as network security, data sanctity and terms of data utilization.
Another mechanism by which professional associations influence outsourcing industry is by strengthening the rule of law. In India, for instance, firms are backing NASSCOM 's proposal to launch a program for background checks that entails the development of criminal and public-records databases (Fest 2005) . NASSCOM also offered to work with authorities in the U.K. and India to investigate a number of cases involving identity theft (tribuneindia.com, 2005) . NASSCOM also helped Bombay's police department establish a cybercrime unit and training officers to investigate data theft. Similar units are planned for nine other cities (Engardio et al. 2004 ). In addition, NASSCOM has partnered with the Ministry of Information Technology to draft a data protection and data-privacy laws to respond to privacy concerns of offshore clients (Hazelwood et al. 2005 , Engardio et al. 2004 ).
Still another mechanism by which trade or professional associations influence the development of the outsourcing industry is by signaling quality to outside parties. Since an outsourcing firm in a developing country faces difficulty to prove quality and other attributes of inputs to potential client firms (Grossman and Helpman 2002) , these associations can assure the latter about competence and integrity of the former (Ward et al. 1993) . The next proposition is: 
Cognitive institutions and offshore BP and IT outsourcing
Culture of modern (Western) management
The lack of modern management in firms in developing countries has been a major barrier to attract BP and IT outsourcing. Modern (Western) management is defined as a set of "scientific, systematic, quantifiable and operational methods" of running an organization and creating value (Branine 1996) . Developing countries lack economic (e.g., modern banking, transportation, and telecommunications) and organizational (consultants, capitalist economics, and management) infrastructures needed to implement modern management (Waddock 1997) .
In India, for instance, there are a few professionally run companies such as Wipro, Infosys (Larkin and Bellman 2004 ). Yet the country's management is highly traditional (Heller 1995) . To attract BP and IT outsourcing, a firm requires to be 'process-driven and detail-oriented'-characteristics that are virtually absent in the Indian work culture (Piramal 2004) . In the same vein, whereas Western countries have the time-is-money culture, Indians have more flexible approach to deadlines (Slater 2003) . Experts argue that the country needs to make a significant progress before a culture of modern and professional management emerges (Bellman 2005) . Similarly, product quality, reliability and on-time delivery often vary greatly in China (Murphy 2004) .
In an attempt to address their clients' fear that customer data will be stolen and even sold to criminals (Lucas 2004) 20 , a number of Indian firms have started instilling the culture of modern management. For instance, call center employees have to undergo security checks although such checks are considered to be "undignified" (The Economist 2005b). Firms have established biometric authentication controls for workers and banned cell phones, pens, paper and Internet/e-mail access for employees (Fest 2005) . Similarly, computer terminals at Mphasis lack hard drives, e-mail, CD-ROM drives, or other ways to store, copy, or forward data 21 (Engardio et al. 2004 ). Likewise, Indian outsourcing firms extensively monitor and analyze employee logs (Fest 2005) . The above leads to the following:
Proposition 5: The culture of modern management is positively associated with BP and IT outsourcing inflow in a destination country.
Cultural compatibility
An outsourcing relationship can be conceptualized as an extension of the client company's culture (Bailor 2005) . If the outsourcing firm does not "walk and talk the same cultural language", as the client firm, the former doesn't fit into the corporate Language similarity, understanding of business practices and ethnic linkages are critical components of cultural compatibility. In terms of language, what is intended to be respectful in one culture becomes annoying in another (Schelmetic 2005) . There are also difficulties related to accents and implied meaning. Although English is an official language in India and there has been the widely held belief that India's huge Englishspeaking population will give it an edge over China and other rising nations in doing business with Western corporations (Mehta 2005) , only a small proportion of graduates meet the standard required to interact with foreigners (Fairell et al. 2005) 22 . An estimate suggests that Indian outsourcing industry will face a shortfall of about 260,000 qualified personnel by 2009 (The Economist 2005b). Customers' complaints regarding difficulties to understand the operators forced some companies to relocate call centers from India to the Philippines (Fairell et al. 2005) . The official language spoken in the Philippines is U.S. English unlike the British English in India.
To overcome language related problems, some outsourcing firms in India hire foreign employees that speak native languages of the client firms' customers. The Indian company, Tecnovate, for instance, has launched a successful nine-language model that employs workers from a number of European countries including Germany, Norway, and Sweden (Overdorf 2005) 23 . Many other companies are emulating this model.
Even those with good command of English may not understand cultural contexts and business practices of the client firm 24 25 . For Indian outsourcing operations, some U.S. 
Discussion and implications
This paper has contributed to the conceptual and empirical understanding of the patterns of global flows of offshore BP and IT outsourcing. The theoretical contribution of this paper is to propose hypotheses that explain the 'Hows' and 'Whys' (Whetten 1989 This paper has important managerial and policy implications:
Implication 1: It is difficult to find an economy that is best in terms of all institutional components discussed in this paper. Nevertheless, outsourcing firms can relocate their activities in a number of locations to optimize the combination of institutional factors.
For instance, Indian outsourcing firm, Infosys, has opened a center in the Czech Republic with 100 people working in 13 languages. In addition to the friendly time-zone, "good political and regulatory environment, multilingual workers and cultural affinity" attracted Infosys to relocate some of its outsourcing businesses in the Czech Republic (The
Economist 2005c).
Implication 2: The degree of cultural compatibility often is a determining factor in the success or failure of an offshore outsourcing project. Assessment of cultural compatibility, however, requires in-depth and detailed analysis of the two cultures. For instance, although some argue that Indians "eat, drink and sleep American culture" because of the pervasiveness of media (Zammit 2005) , a number of outsourcing projects failed in India because of the lack of cultural compatibility. Consider, for instance, the enlarging EU. The new and candidate countries are required to ensure the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and the promotion of free market economy. Newly joined and candidate countries have already experienced a by-product of fulfilling the minimum requirements in these domains, en route to their (imminent) entry into the EU (Zielonka 2004 introducing business-friendly policies and employing heavy marketing, they can capture a growing share of the offshore outsourcing market originating from the U.S. with the progress of CAFTA (Harman 2005) .
Implication 8:
Governments in outsourcing origin countries should also consider noneconomic benefits of offshore outsourcing. For instance, the level of barrier erected to offshore outsourcing influences other countries' willingness to reduce trade and investment related barriers 26 .
An important area of future research concerns conducting in-depth case studies of selected outsourcing relationships from the standpoint of institutions. Institutionalists have recognized that whereas regulative institutions have economic impacts, normative and cognitive institutions are social, cultural, and habitual in nature (Scott 1995 (Scott , 2001 ).
Compared to other research methods, relative efficacy of case studies is especially greater in exploring how normative and cognitive institutions affect outsourcing activities. Such a study can thus provide insights into how and to what extent institutions determine the success or failure of outsourcing projects.
Another fruitful avenue for future research would be to employ survey research to compare institutional characteristics of successful and unsuccessful outsourcing relations.
Surveys can be used to capture client firms' perceptions of their outsourcing partners' institutional characteristics. These characteristics can be analyzed by using binary outcome models such as logit and probit to predict success/failure of outsourcing projects.
We also encourage researchers to examine deeply how institutions are affected by outsourcing activities. As noted above, offshore outsourcing activities have generated confrontational reactions and raised a public outcry in industrialized countries such as the U.S. We, however, know very little about the "exact" nature of mechanisms in such responses.
